Nothing in the world is more dangerous than      sincere ignorance and conscientious stupidity.


     -     Martin Luther King Jr.




                   Adv. Vivek Ramteke


                   All India SC,  ST & Minority

                       Lawyers Association


The above quote by Martin Luther King Jr. is so apt to describe the gross abuse of power and blatant illegality committed by the Bench of Justice (Retd.) Deepak Gupta and Justice Aniruddha Bose while dealing with Contempt Petition Re: Vijay Kurle and others (Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Crl.) No. 02 of 2019).

The judgment passed by the bench of Justice (Retd.) Deepak Gupta and Justice Aniruddha Bose is the best example of how a judgment, that too of Apex Court OUGHT NOT TO BE!


                          Justice Deepak Gupta

            These two brilliant minds have not left a single opportunity to leave the reader of the judgment utterly disgusted and disappointed by the lack of knowledge, ignorance of basic law, doctrines and sound principles of law, displayed by these two judges in the judgment passed by them on 27.04.2020.

        Having got an opportunity to peruse the relevant documents and submissions of all the parties including that of Amicus Curiae and the copy of Judgment dated 27.04.2020, it can be well inferred that Justice (Retd.) Deepak Gupta and Justice Aniruddha Bose have delivered a severely botched up judgment by blatantly misinterpreting and twisting the legal position on several counts and by contumaciously disregarding the binding precedents of larger/constitutional Benches. Their aide Amicus Curiae Adv. Siddharth Luthra, whose role was to assist the Court, has indulged in all possible tactics to mislead the Court by brazenly providing overruled judgments and more such unfair practices which would directly qualify as acts of professional misconduct. Despite the Amicus Curiae’s shrewd approach adopted by Amicus Curiae in misleading the Court, the Court had ample opportunity and material on record coming from all three Respondents in strong rebuttal to the oral and written submissions of Amicus Curiae. Unfortunately, the Judges have squandered several golden chances available to them to set right the things which had gone terribly awry right from the inception of the case i.e. right from Justice Rohinton Nariman acting as judge in his own cause by issuing show cause notice to two complainants (Mr. Vijay Kurle and Mr. Rashid Khan Pathan) for contempt of court, when both the complaints were against Justice Nariman himself. The reasons for including other two persons – Mr. Nilesh Ojha and Mr. Mathews Nedumpara in the aforementioned show cause notice on flimsy ground that both were acting in tandem.

Being a legal practitioner for more than forty years now and having witnessed and read about the glorious as well as chequered parts of the history of courts in our country, I felt a strong urge to write about this particular judgment which shall impact all the stakeholders of our justice delivery systems – Judges, lawyers, government pleaders, litigants, common public. Moreover, any judgment of the Apex court of our country has wide ramifications.

This is my first article out of three in the series and I have made best attempt to explain succinctly as to how the judgment dated 27.04.2020 is vitiated and non est.   


  The first aspect that has shocked me is the new law declared by the   Bench of   Justice   (Retd.) Deepak Gupta and Justice Aniruddha Bose, through their judgment dated 27.04.2020 which in sum indicates that -

        ‘Any law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court is not binding on any party unless and until it is approved by    the Editor of Lexis-Nexis.’

     If you are confused after reading the above statement, please read further, since we now have a bigger question in front of us as to what to follow – contents published by Lexis Nexis or the factual position on law holding the field?

Amicus Curie Sr. Adv. Luthra had submitted his written arguments, in which he had pointed out to the Court that;

i.         As per law laid down by 2-Judge Bench in Pritam Pal’s Case 1992 (1) SCALE 416, the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act,1971 are not applicable to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court can pass any order against the law, statutes and rules.

ii.         As per the ratio laid down in C. K. Daphtary Vs. O.P. Gupta (1971) 1 SCC 626 and in Dr. D.C Saxena’s Case (1996) 5 SCC 216, no one can attribute motive to the Judge even if the Judge is guilty of serious offences.

In rebuttal to above submissions, Adv. Nilesh Ojha (Respondent No. 3), Adv. Partho Sarkar (Counsel for Respondent No.1 - Mr. Vijay Kurle) and Adv. Ghanshyam Upadhya (Counsel for Respondent No. 2 – Mr. Rashid Khan Pathan) in their written submissions had pointed out that -

i.          The ratio laid down in Pritam Pal Singh’s case and all other judgments of smaller or co equal benches passed by ignoring judgment of Constitution Bench in Baradkanta Mishra (1974) 1 SCC 374 are per incuriam. In Baradkant Mishra’s case, it is ruled that the cases wherein scandalizing of the Court has been alleged, the proceedings are governed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

This legal position is upheld and followed by the Constitution Bench in Subramanyam Swami's case (2014) SCC 344 as well as in Re: C. S. Karnan’s case  (2017) 7 SCC 1.

ii.       The Full Bench in Bal Thackrey’s Case (2005) 1 SCC 254, has disapproved that part of ratio laid down in Pritam Pal’s case which was decided by a 2-Judge Bench, where it is said that power under Article 129 and 215 is not controlled by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Therefore the ratio of Pritam Pal’s Case is overruled. Furthermore, the other Full Bench Judgment in Pallav Seth (2001) 7 SCC 549 and Maheshwar Peri (2016) 14 SCC 251, had specifically ruled that, the proceedings under either Article 129 or Article 215 must be conducted as per the provisions of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

iii.       The judgment in C. K. Daphtary Vs. O.P. Gupta (1971) 1 SCC 626 case was declared to be no longer a good law as it was of repealed Act. It is clarified by the Supreme Court in:


   a)  P.N.Duda’s case (1988) 3 SCC 167


   b) Biman Basu’s case (2010) 8 SCC 673 [Para 17]

It was held by the Supreme Court that, since the judgment of C. K. Daphtary is delivered before the new Act of 1971, it is no longer a good law.

iv.          The judgment of Pritam Pal’s case 1992 (1) SCALE 416, was also criticized by ‘‘The National Commission to Review the working of the Constitution [NCRWC]”.

Based on the report of NCRWC the Contempt of Courts Act 2006 is amended.

The Constitution Bench in Subramanian Swamy’s case (2014) 12 SCC 344, had referred the report of NCRWC and clarified that, the proceedings under Article 129 of the Constitution have to be conducted as per section 2,13,15,17 etc. of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

v.           The judgment in C. K. Daphtary (supra) and Dr. D.C. Saxena’s case (supra), is per-incuriam and overruled.

It is per-incuriam for not considering the earlier binding precedent of Constitution Bench in Bathina Reddy’s case AIR 1952 SC 149, where it is ruled that, if any party is having proof that the Judge has passed an order for malafide purposes, then it is for the public good that such proof should be published.

It is overruled because of later Seven - Judge Constitution Bench judgments in Re: C.S. Karnan (2017) 7 SCC 1, Subramanian Swamy (2014) 12 SCC 344, Re: Lalith Kalitha 2008 (1) GLT 800, R.K. Jain (2010) 8 SCC 281 etc.

i.           The Counsels for the Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 had prayed for action against Sr. Adv. Siddharth Luthra for providing overruled judgments, which is a gross professional misconduct and falling standard of professional ethics and unbecoming of someone who is a designated Senior Advocate. The Counsels have also prayed for striping off the designation of Senior Counsel conferred on Adv. Siddharth Luthra,  as per the law laid down in Lal Bahadur Gautam (2019) 6 SCC 441, Nalinikanta (2004) 7 SCC 19, Heena Dharia 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 9859, E.S. Reddy (1987) 3 SCC 258.

Now, in response to the accusation of providing overruled judgments, Sr. Adv. Siddharth Luthra, in his written argument dated 02.03.2020, has made submission that, since the "Case Treatment'' obtained from ‘‘Lexis - Nexis’’ of Pritam Pal's case(supra), Dr.D.C. Saxena’s case (supra), C. K. Daphtary (supra), is not showing them as overruled or per- incuriam, these are to be considered as binding precedents !! [Para 13.7 of his submission].

Amicus Curiae Adv. Luthra has gone to the extent of attaching the screenshots from Lexis-Nexis software to prove his stand of justifying his utterly cavalier approach of relying on the results displayed by a legal software rather than checking the factual position.

   Such an approach could have been understandable at the most from a novice in the field of law or a law intern who is learning the ropes, but not from someone who is a designated Senior Advocate. Mr. Siddharth Luthra who was expected to know the basic law of binding precedents.

Para 13.7 on page 32 of the written submission by Amicus Curiae is reproduced below verbatim:

“13.7. However, in order to rebut the allegations made by Respondent No.3, the Amicus has annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE ‘A’ the ‘Case-Treatment’ obtained from Lexis-Nexis’ of the following cases, which are incorrectly alleged to be per incuriam or alleged to be overruled by the Respondent No. 3

         a. C.K. Daphtary case


         b. Pritam Pal case


        c. Supreme Court Bar Association case


        d. Zahira Shaikh case


        e. D.C. Saxena case”

You may refer to the screen shots from Lexis Nexis as provided by Amicus Curiae in his written submission.

    Justice Deepak Gupta, vide his order dated 02.03. 2020 had directed Respondents to submit their reply by 16.03.2020 to above submission of Adv. Luthra.

On 16.03.2020, all the Respondents in their written submissions had again pointed out the law of binding precedent that the law laid down by Full Bench in C.N.Rudramuthy's case (1998) 8 SCC 275, wherein it is ruled that, when view taken by higher benches is on record, then the Supreme Court need not re-examine a case which had by implication, be declared incorrect. Hence the other contrary view taken by Smaller Benches stands impliedly overruled. If provisions of Act are explicitly explained by the Larger Benches, then no contrary view is permissible by Smaller Benches.

   In Lal Bahadur Gautam (2019) 6 SCC 441, it is ruled that, the reliance on the judgment of a repealed Act amounts to reliance on an overruled judgment by the advocate and is therefore a professional misconduct.

          It was pointed out that, the opinion of ‘Author or Editor’ cannot supersede the ratio laid down by Full Bench and Constitution Bench.

             Similar view is taken in Sandeep Bafna’s Case (2014) 16 SCC 623, Mr. Roy Joseph Creado 2008 ALL MR (Cri.) 851.


Despite the settled law, Justice (Retd.) Deepak Gupta has accepted the submission of Mr. Siddharth Luthra and has refused to follow the Full Bench and Constitutional Bench judgments, his rationale being that these judgments are contrary to the view taken by author Mr. Samaraditya Pal of the book ‘The Law of Contempt (2013)’ published by Lexis Nexis and Justice (Retd.) Deepak Gupta further chose to follow the author’s editorial note in the book by ‘Lexis Nexis’ and relied on the overruled judgment of smaller benches. In para 7 of the judgment pronounced by the Bench of Justice (Retd.) Deepak Gupta and Justice Aniruddha Bose on 27.04.2020, it is observed as under;

      ‘‘7. Before we deal with the objections individually, we need to understand what are the powers of the Supreme Court of India in relation to dealing with contempt of the Supreme Court in the light of Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution of India when read in conjunction with the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. According to the alleged contemnors, the Contempt of Courts Act is the final word in the matter and if the procedure prescribed under the Contempt of Courts Act has not been followed then the proceedings have to be dropped. On the other hand, Shri Sidharth Luthra, learned amicus curiae while making reference to a large number of decisions contends that the Supreme Court being a Court of Record is not bound by the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. The only requirement is that the procedure followed is just and fair and in accordance with the principles of natural justice.

Article 129 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:

       “129. Supreme Court to be a court of record - The Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.”

A bare reading of Article 129 clearly shows that this Court being a Court of Record shall have all the powers of such a Court of Record including the power to punish for contempt of itself. This is a constitutional power which cannot be taken away or in any manner abridged by statute.

……….. A comparison of the provisions of Article 129 and clause (2) of Article 142 clearly shows that whereas the founding fathers felt that the powers under clause 92) of Article 142 could be subject to any law made by parliament, there is no such restriction as far as Article 129 is concerned. The power under clause (2) of Article 142 is not the primary source of power of Court of Record which is Article 129 and there is no such restriction in Article 129. Samaraditya Pal in the Law of Contempt- -Pg 9-10 The law of Contempt- contempt of Courts and legislatures, Fifth Edn. Lexis Nexis Butterworth Wadhawa, Nagpur(2013) has very succinctly stated the legal position as follows:

 “Although the law of contempt is largely governed by the 1971 Act, it is now settled law in India that the High Courts and the Supreme Court derive their jurisdiction and power from Articles 215 and 129 of the Constitution. This situation results in giving scope for “judicial self-dealing”.

The High Courts also enjoy similar powers like the Supreme Court under Article 215 of the Constitution. The main argument of the alleged contemnors is that notice should have been issued in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and any violation of the Contempt of Courts Act would vitiate the entire proceedings. We do not accept this argument. In view of the fact that the power to punish for contempt of itself is a constitutional power vested in this Court, such power cannot be abridged or taken away even by legislative enactment.’’

             The above view taken by the Bench of Justice Deepak Gupta is in direct contravention of the law laid down by the Full Bench in Bal Thackeray's case (2005) 1 SCC 254 and by Pallav Seth’s Case (2001) 7 SCC 549.

In Pallav Sheth's case (2001) 7 SCC 549 it is ruled as under;

“31. This Court has always frowned upon the grant or existence of absolute or unbridled power. Just as power or jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be exercised in accordance with law, if any, enacted by the legislature it would stand to reason that the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215 should be exercised in consonance with the provisions of a validly enacted law. In case of apparent or likelihood of conflict the provisions should be construed harmoniously.

     32. …….. A three-Judge Bench in Dr L.P. Misra case [(1998) 7 SCC 379] observed that the procedure provided by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 had to be followed even in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution. It would, therefore, follow that if Section 20 is so interpreted that it does not stultify the powers under Article 129 or Article 215 then, like other provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act relating to the extent of punishment which can be imposed, a reasonable period of limitation can also be provided.”

             In Bal Thackeray's case (2005) 1 SCC 254, the conviction was set aside for not following the provisions of the Act. It is ruled as under;

“23. In these matters, the question is not about compliance or non- compliance of the principles of natural justice by granting adequate opportunity to the appellant but is about compliance of the mandatory requirements of Section 15 of the Act. As already noticed the procedure of

Section 15 is required to be followed even when petition is filed by a party under Article 215 of the Constitution, though in these matters petitions filed were under Section  15  of the Act.................................... In absence of compliance of mandatory requirement of Section 15, the petitions were not maintainable.

24.  As a result of aforesaid view, it is unnecessary to examine in the present case, the effect of non-compliance of the directions issued in Duda's case by placing the informative papers before the Chief Justice of the High Court.

25.  For the foregoing reasons we set aside the impugned judgment and allow the appeals. Fine, if deposited by the appellant shall be refunded to him.

Furthermore Justice Deepak Gupta has also refused to follow the binding judgment in P.N. Duda's case (1988) 3 SCC 167 by declaring it as an obiter.

The judgments in Pallav Sheth’s case and P.N. Duda's case are followed by around 291 (Pallac Sheth’s case by approx. 183 Benches and P.N. Duda case by approx.108 Benches)  Benches of the Supreme Court and High Courts.

Justice Gupta has applied the yardstick that if author Samaraditya Pal's view in the book of ‘Lexis Nexis’ as interpreted by Justice Gupta, does not concur with any of the judgments of the Full Bench and Constitutional Bench, then such judgments are liable to be rejected even if it tantamount to accepting judgments of smaller benches even if these are overruled or per-incuriam, only on the ground that their ratio matches with the view of the author as suggested by Sr. Adv. Siddharth Luthra.

Justice Deepak Gupta has also refused to follow the law that only Chief Justice of India is the of Master of Roster, as laid down in Prakash Chand's case (1998) 1 SCC 1 and followed in Bal Thackeray's case, and in his judgment dated 27.04.2020, said that as per Article 129, any Judge and or Bench can take cognizance of the contempt without the same being assigned to him by the Chief Justice.

     The above view is against the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Campaign for Judicial Reforms (2018) 1 SCC 196, wherein para 10 it is ruled that any judgment by any Judge or Bench of the Supreme Court, without being assigned by the Chief Justice of India cannot be executed. It stands vitiated, null and void. It is ruled as under;

 ‘‘10. The rules have been framed in that regard. True, the rules deal with reference, but the law laid down in Prakash Chand [State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 1 SCC 1] has to apply to the Supreme Court so that there will be smooth functioning of the Court and there is no chaos in the administration of justice dispensation system. If any such order has been passed by any Bench, that cannot hold the field as that will be running counter to the order passed by the Constitution Bench. Needless to say, no Judge can take up the matter on his own, unless allocated by the Chief Justice of India, as he is the Master of the Roster.’’

      Owing to such creative and novel approach of the Supreme Court Judges of blindly trusting the submissions of Amicus Curiae, without applying their own mind and solely relying on the stand taken by Amicus that the legal software and books published by the publisher Lexis-Nexis are more accurate than the factual position on the law holding the field, the lawyers in India and Judges of High Courts including Secretary General of the Supreme Court are facing a predicament as to which law to follow now onwards.

Given the patent and grave errors committed by Justice (Retd.) Deepak Gupta and Justice Aniruddha Bose, the members of the legal fraternity and common citizenry expect the Chief Justice of India to suo-motu intervene and clear the issue and prevent further damage to the highest temple of justice in the country.

        It is worthwhile to quote para 4 of  a judgment of Bombay High Court in Suresh Subhashrao Bhoyer Vs. Shri Manohar s/o Narayan Bhagat (Contempt Petition No.276 of 2007, Writ Petition No.6582 of 2005), where it was ruled that:


    “4. Now, first dealing with the objections raised by  the learne  Counsel, one has to be alive to the factual position coupled with                        legal parameters and also the discipline. The judgment in the matter of Pritam Pal's case (Pritam Pal Vs. High Court of       Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur, 1992 SCW 681) dated 19.2.1992 was rendered by two Honorable Lordships of the Supreme  Court, while the judgment in the matter of Pallav Sheth (Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian and others, AIR 2001 SC 2763) was by the three Honourable Judges of the Supreme Court. Consequently, no astrologer is required to comment that the later judgment  rendered by the Supreme Court by the three Honourable  Judges on 10.8.2001 will only hold the field. The submissions               vociferously advanced needs only to be discarded.”

I am till today deeply disturbed upon thinking that there are some Judges in our Supreme Court, who are so na├»ve that they do not understand that a judgment passed by three judge bench or a constitution bench overrules the judgment passed by two judge or single judge bench if both are dealing with  the same question of law.

There is no doubt that all the Presiding officers and Judges of High Courts and Supreme Courts are well aware of Article 141 of our Indian Constitution. But this particular judgment has shaken my conscience and has forced me to think whether Supreme Court is living up to its role of Protector of Rule of Law?

Amicus Curiae Adv. Siddharth Luthra whose intellectual caliber was amply displayed through his act of providing screen shots of Lexis Nexis software to justify that overruled judgment were valid since the software did not indicate these as over ruled, has made another preposterous submission – which even when committed by any of the interns of my office, would have called for severe admonishment.

Amicus Curiae Adv. Siddharth Luthra, has made following submission which is so outrageously erroneous that it raises serious concerns over the credibility of process of conferring the designation of ‘Senior Advocates’.

In para 10.39 on page no. 20 of his submission dated 02.03.2020, he states that in Pallav Sheth’s case (2001) 7 SCC 549, the Zahira Shaikh’s case (2006) 3 SCC 374 was not even referred to.

Now, Pallav Sheth’s case pertains to 2001 and Zahira Shaikh’s case is of 2006. The citations are (2001) 7 SCC 549 and (2006) 3 SCC 374 respectively.

Did the learned Amicus Curiae expect that the SC Bench would preempt in 2001 what it would decide in Zahra Shaikh’s case which came up in Supreme Court in 2006??

A photo extract of the submission of Amicus Curiae is attached herewith to leave no room for doubt in minds of those readers who would find it difficult to digest the fact that someone of stature of Senior Advocate has actually committed such a serious blunder.

This ridiculous submission of Amicus Curiae was rebutted by Respondents in their written submission by stating that:

“10. And the height is in para 10.39 of submission by Ld. Amicus, where it is submitted that, since in Pallav Sheth’s Case (2001) 7 SCC 549 it is not said that Zahra Shaikh (2006) 3 SCC 374 is not per-incuriam therefore, it cannot be treated as per-incuriam. It is ludicrous. How this Hon’ble Court in the year 2001 in Pallav Sheth will be knowing and mentioning as to in future in 2006 the judgment in Zahira Shaikh will be delivered per-incuriam.”

The screen shot of above from the Respondent’s submission is also attached herewith.

Such shoddy submissions from a person who is designated Senior Advocate and who has been Additional Solicitor General in the past are highly condemnable.

In the same para 10.39 on page no. 20 of his submission, Amicus Curiae states that since the Constitution Bench of 7-Judges in Re: C.S. Karnan’s case (2017) 7 SCC 1 did not refer to the Zahira Shaikh’s case (2006) 3 SCC 374, therefore view taken by the 2-Judge bench in Zahira Shaikh’s judgment, even if contrary to Constitution bench’s judgment, is binding.

To this, the Respondents have clarified that the law regarding this was laid down by Full Bench in C.N. Rudramurthy (1998) 8 SCC 275 where it was  ruled that, when view taken by higher benches is on record, then the Supreme Court need not re-examine a case which had by implication been declared incorrect. The other contrary view by Smaller Benches stands impliedly overruled. If provisions of Act are explained by the larger benches, then no contrary view is permissible by smaller Benches.

But Sr. Counsel Mr. Luthra seems to be bereft of knowledge of this basic legal principle.

Moreover, what was the compulsion for Justice (Retd.) Deepak Gupta and Justice Aniruddha Bose to flagrantly overlook the binding precedents especially when Respondents had very clearly brought out the binding precedents applicable in this matter and where there was no room for discretion for the judges to oscillate beyond the established law regarding proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

What Justice (Retd.) Deepak Gupta and Justice Aniruddha Bose have

delivered on 27.04.2020 is not fit to be called a judicial determination, but is a farce. I say this owing to following:

a.    The Bench has deliberately disregarded around 158 binding precedents of Hon’ble Supreme Court and I feel more might surface as I revisit the judgment for penning down Part 2 of this series.

b.    Wilful and obdurate neglect of several legal points which were vehemently put forth by the Respondents time and again (which fortunately are part of the records of the case today)

c.    The judgment that runs into 92 pages contains page wise analysis of the complaints of Shri. Vijay Kurle and Shri. Rashid Khan Pathan – which is in fact a unilateral analysis by the Bench since there was never a submission or argument either by Amicus Curiae or the Respondents on any of the observations by the Bench made on page 51 to 91 of the judgment dated 27.04.2020! This is evident from the orders uploaded on the website of Supreme Court for each date of proceeding as well as written submissions of all the Respondents as well as Amicus Curiae. What more do we need to term such act as a legal malice?

d.    Now the crescendo – As per the order dated 09.12.2019, the matter was fixed for deciding preliminary objections and the discharge application and should the discharge application be rejected, then the Bench was to decide whether charge was liable to be framed or not. While the Bench decided to hear preliminary objections and main matter together (which is illegal and not permissible as per law), the Bench was expected to pass an order on discharge applications filed by Respondents. But such was the hurry to hold the respondents guilty of contempt, that the Bench has jumped the gun and pronounced the final judgment directly. The farce did not end here…

e.    The principles of natural justice were unabashedly thrown out of the window by these two judges, who denied the respondents reasonable time to avail of legal remedies that they were entitled to upon being held guilty. Despite the global pandemic caused by corona virus and the ensuing technological challenges in conducting hearing through video conferencing, Justice (Retd.) Deepak Gupta and Justice Aniruddha Bose showed tearing hurry and forced the Counsel for Respondent 2 to argue on sentence on a whatsapp video call – providing a lame excuse that Justice Deepak Gupta was about to retire in a couple of days thereafter and hence the hurry to decide on sentencing. This is included in the order dated 05.05.2020.

There are several other grounds wherein Justice (Retd.) Deepak Gupta and Justice Aniruddha Bose have openly flouted the sacred legal principles and doctrines, which are reflected ex facie in the judgment.

It certainly warrants a separate and exclusive publication.

The present case reminds me the words of Albert Einstein -

“Human genius has its limits, but stupidity does not.”

Please watch this space for Part II of this series.

    Best Regards 

  Adv. Vivek Ramteke